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1 Introduction
Postal regulators around the world are currently confronted with the ques-
tion which regulatory regime maximizes social welfare. Economists have
developed theoretical models to compare the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent reg-
ulatory scenarios (De Donder et al. 2005, Panzar 2002, Billette de Villemeur
et al. 2003, Dietl and Waller 2002, Dietl et al. 2005). Although innovation
is regarded as the driving force of social progress, economic development
and welfare gains, relatively little is known about the e¤ect of regulation on
innovation in the postal sector. Proponents of market liberalization often
cite more innovations as the major benet when confronted with arguments
such as the graveyard spiral and delivery economies of scale.
To date, economists have not explicitly modelled the e¤ect of market
liberalization, work sharing and other forms of postal regulation on inno-
vation. We try to ll this gap by presenting a game-theoretic model that
predicts the e¤ect of regulatory decisions on innovation incentives in letter
markets. Our model focuses on process innovations which are by large the
major innovations within the postal sector.
We compare four di¤erent regulatory scenarios: postal monopoly, end-
to-end competition, and access regulation with and without bypass. These
regulatory regimes represent the current and/or planned regulatory environ-
ment of developed countries. Quantitative results based on model parame-
trization will allow us to compare the innovation incentives, and the e¤ects
of innovation on welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our
model for each of the di¤erent regulatory scenarios. In section 3 we calibrate
the model with Swiss data. Section 4 contains the main results, which
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are subjected to some sensitivity analysis in Section 5. In Section 6, we
examine how the results change when we introduce spillover e¤ects. Section
7 concludes.
2 Model
We develop a model to analyze the impact of postal regulation on innovation.
We introduce the model by presenting the reference case, i.e. the regulated
monopoly. Afterwards, we adapt the model to allow for multiple service
providers and we consider three alternative regulatory scenarios: end-to-end
competition, work sharing without bypass and work sharing with bypass.
2.1 Reference Case: Regulated Monopoly
For the demand side, we assume a representative customer (or sender) whose
utility depends on the quantity of letters sent, which in turn depends on
prices. We assume quasilinear preferences with respect to money and a
quadratic utility function over quantities. Furthermore, we divide the mar-
ket into two di¤erent regions r = fh;lg, where h denotes the highly populated
region (or urban region) and l the less populated region (or rural region). We
also assume that there are no information asymmetries. Our model builds
on Dietl et al. (2005). The representative sender has the utility function
U

qh; ql; y

=
P
r

arqr   1
2
br (qr)2

+ y
where a; b > 0. Variables qh and ql refer to the amount of mail sent to each
region, and y is the amount of money spent on other goods. Parameter
a inuences market size, while b varies with regards to the price elasticity
of demand. The representative sender has to satisfy the budget constraint
y+p
P
r q
r  m, where p represents the monopolists uniform price for both
regions and m describes the initial wealth endowment. Utility maximiza-
tion implies that the budget constraint holds with equality. The demand
functions for each region are therefore given by
qr(p) =
1
br
(ar   p)
Activities along the postal value chain are divided into two segments s =
fu; dg. The activities of collection, transportation and sorting are regarded
as a composite upstream activity denoted by u. Delivery, the downstream
2
activity, is denoted by d: We assume that the costs for the composite up-
stream activity are fully variable, and denote these marginal costs by cru.
In contrast, part of the monopolists downstream costs are considered to
be xed, since the universal service obligation requires the monopolist to
maintain its delivery network irrespective of market demand. We denote
these xed costs by Fd, and the variable downstream costs by crd. Process
innovations are introduced into the model by an option to reduce the initial
marginal costs by an amount equal to krs . To achieve this reduction the ser-
vice provider must invest an amount of Irs =
1
2z (k
r
s)
2, where z > 0. Prot
is therefore given by the function
 =
P
r

p P
s
(crs   krs)

qr  P
s
Irs

  Fd
Given the uniform price set by the regulating authority, the monopolist
maximizes prot by choice of krs , leading in the equilibrium to marginal cost
reductions through process innovations equal to
krs =
1
zbr
(ar   p)
Thus, in the case of a single monopolistic service provider, the incentives to
innovate increase linearly with demand in the respective region.
2.2 Multiple Service Providers
We now add the possibility of market entry by an additional service provider.
As in the case of a monopoly, the incumbent I must serve both regions at
a uniform price pI . The entrant E may enter one or both regions, and is
free to maximize prots by choice of di¤erent prices prE for each region. The
customersutility function assumes the form
U

qhI ; q
l
I ; q
h
E ; q
l
E ; y

=
P
r
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arIq
r
I  
br
2
(qrI)
2 + arEq
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2
(qrE)
2   ebrqrIqrE

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where a; b > 0 and 0 < e < 1. The parameter e allows for di¤erentiated
products. The restriction imposed on this parameter means that the service
providersproducts are imperfect substitutes. Given the budget constraint
y +
P
r (pIq
r
I + p
r
Eq
r
E)  m, the representative customersutility maximiza-
tion problem results in the demand functions
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qrI(pI ; p
r
E) =
1
br(1  e2) (a
r
I   earE   pI + eprE)
qrE(p
r
E ; pI) =
1
br(1  e2) (a
r
E   earI   prE + epI)
As in the reference case, we assume that the incumbents upstream costs
are variable, while its downstream costs are partly xed. In contrast, the
entrant is free of any universal service obligation. Thus, we consider the
entrants costs over the whole value chain to be entirely variable. We denote
the entrants initial marginal costs for the composite upstream activity by
crEu and for delivery by c
r
Ed. The entrant can reduce initial marginal costs
by an amount equal to krEs. The corresponding investments into process
innovations are equal to IrEs =
1
2z (k
r
Es)
2.
2.2.1 End-to-End Competition
In the case of end-to-end competition, the entrant must compete with the
incumbent over the whole value chain. Prots are determined by the func-
tions
I =
P
r

pI  
P
s
(crIs   krIs)

qrI  
P
s
IrIs

  FId
E =
P
r

prE  
P
s
(crEs   krEs)

qrE  
P
s
IrEs

The rst term of each operators prot function describes the prot mar-
gin in each region. It results from the price per unit of mail, subtracted by
the marginal costs after reduction by process innovations. The second term
contains the investment into process innovation. For the incumbent, this
investment concerns expenditures into the up- and downstream segment of
both urban and rural areas. Depending on where the entrant is active, the
entrants investment concerns either one or both regions, or none at all.
Assuming a uniform price pI set by the regulator, the incumbent max-
imizes prots by choice of krIs, while the entrant is free to choose di¤erent
prices and therefore maximizes simultaneously for prE and k
r
Es. Depending
on the parameters, the entrant may choose prices prE such that the demand
function qrE(p
r
E ; pI) gives a negative value. In this case, we set q
r
E = 0 and
assume that the entrant does not enter region r. In particular, the entrant
may not be able to set prices in the rural region that are su¢ ciently high to
compensate the entrants marginal costs, yet su¢ ciently low to be compet-
itive with the incumbents uniform price pI .
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2.2.2 Work Sharing without Bypass
In the case of work sharing without bypass, the incumbent receives com-
petition concerning the upstream activities. The incumbent retains the
monopoly regarding delivery, but is required to grant the entrant access
and to deliver the entrants mail at a uniform access price  per unit of
mail. We assume that the access price is determined by the regulatory au-
thority and treat it as an exogenous variable. Prot functions are now given
by
I =
P
r

pI  
P
s
(crIs   krIs)

qrI  
P
s
IrIs + (  crIs + krIs) qrE

  FId
E =
P
r
[(prE   (crEu   krEu + )) qrE   IrEu]
For the incumbents prot function, the rst term refers to the margin result-
ing from mail collected, sorted, transported and delivered by the incumbent.
The second term contains the investment into up- and downstream process
innovations in both urban and rural markets. The third term describes the
additional revenues from the transfer fee, subtracted by the incumbents
marginal costs for delivery. Comparing the entrants prot function in the
case of work sharing with the entrants prot function under end-to-end
competition shows that the prot function takes a similar form. The dif-
ference is that in the case of work sharing without bypass, the entrants
marginal costs for delivery are replaced by the access fee per unit of mail
the entrant must transfer to the incumbent. Furthermore, the entrant has no
incentives to innovate in the downstream segment. Given the incumbents
uniform price pI , the incumbent maximizes prot for krIs, while the entrant
maximizes for prE and k
r
Eu. Depending on whether the resulting prices p
r
E
result in a positive demand for the entrants services, the entrant enters one
or both regions.
2.2.3 Work Sharing with Bypass
The case of work sharing with bypass can be seen as a combination of the
previous cases. The entrant is given a choice to enter one or both regions,
and to either compete with the incumbent over the whole value chain, or
to provide only the upstream activities and use the incumbents delivery
network. This choice does not have to be the same in the two regions.
In particular, it may be desirable for the entrant to use the distribution
network of the incumbent in the rural region and to provide distribution
only in the urban region. The entrants choice on whether or not to compete
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over the whole value chain depends on how the entrants marginal costs
after reduction by process innovations compare to the access price to the
incumbents delivery network. If  > crEd   krEd, the entrant chooses end-
to-end competition in region r, assuming he decides to enter, and if  <
crEd   krEd the entrant uses the incumbents delivery network in the case of
entry.
If  > crEd krEd8r, prot functions are the same as in the case of end-to-
end competition. If  < crEd   krEd8r, prots are equal to the prots in the
case of work sharing without bypass. In the case where the entrant takes
advantage of the incumbents delivery network only in the less populated
region, that is for  > chEd   khEd and  < clEd   klEd, prots are given by
I =
P
r

pI  
P
s
(crIs   krIs)

qrI  
P
s
IrIs

+

  clIs + klIs

qlE   FId
E =

phE  
P
s

chEs   khEs

qhE  
P
s
IhEs
+

plE  

clEu   klEu + 

qlE   I lEu
The incumbents prot function is the same as under work sharing with-
out bypass, except that the incumbent only receives transfers resulting from
the delivery of the entrants mail to the rural regions. The rst line of the
entrants prot function describes the part of the prot resulting from com-
peting end-to-end in the highly populated region. The second line concerns
the revenue from the less populated region, subtracted by the entrants corre-
sponding upstream costs and the access charge transferred to the incumbent.
The choice variables are the same as in the previous cases.
3 Parametrization with Swiss Data
In order to obtain quantitative results, we calibrated our model for the
reference case, i.e. regulated monopoly, with data of the Swiss letter market.
Then, we modify the parameters accordingly so as to predict the outcomes
for multiple service providers. Our method of parametrization relates to
the one used in Dietl et al. (2005). We used simplied assumptions for the
values of the parameters whenever we felt that it did not critically a¤ect the
results. To calculate the parameters of the demand function in the case of a
regulated monopoly, we assumed a uniform price equal to pRM = e 0:5, and
a corresponding total demand of qRM = 3 billion. Furthermore, we assumed
that a quarter of the total amount was sent to the less populated region l,
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thus qhRM = 2:25 billion and q
l
RM = 750 million. Concerning price elasticity
of demand, we used  =  0:5: By substituting pRM , qRM and  =  0:5 into
qrRM (pRM ) =
arRM   pRM
brRM
and  =   1
brRM
pRM
qrRM
we can calculate the parameters determining the demand function of each
region in the reference case.
To determine the parameters of the cost side, we set the monopolists
prot under the regulated price equal to zero (RM = 0), which reects the
fact that Swiss post approximately breaks even in the letter market. Total
delivery costs amount for approximately half of total costs, which equals half
the total revenue under the assumption that there is no prot. It is estimated
that approximately 60% of the monopolists delivery costs are xed, that is
Fd = e 450 million. Given the proportion between marginal costs in the
urban and rural regions, as well as the observed prices, quantities, prots
and xed costs in the reference case, we can derive the marginal costs for
each activity. Under the assumption that clu = 2c
h
u, we get c
h
u =e 0:20 and
clu = e 0:40 for the composite upstream activity, and c
h
d =e 0:08 and c
l
d =
e 0:16 for delivery.
The nal parameter necessary to complete the parametrization of the
reference case is z, which determines the relationship between innovation
incentives reected by marginal cost reductions k and the necessary invest-
ment I(k):We chose a su¢ ciently high value for z so that the cost reductions
krs chosen by the monopolist in the equilibrium are at all times smaller than
the marginal costs crs without the need to impose any additional restrictions.
At the same time, the calculated incentives should be signicant, yet not
unreasonably high. By doing sensitivity analysis, we decided on the value
z = 6  1010:
The values chosen for the parameters are not exact, therefore the ab-
solute values of our results can only serve as a rough approximation. The
values are however su¢ ciently realistic to allow for an ordinal comparison
of results between the di¤erent regulatory scenarios.
In order to adapt our calibrated model to accommodate multiple service
providers, we used the method outlined in Dietl et al. (2005). We set the
parameter determining the degree of product di¤erentiation to be equal to
e = 0:75. We further assumed the percentage of total demand the incumbent
receives, in case the entrant o¤ers the same price, to be equal to x = 70%.
This value reects the incumbents advantage resulting from switching costs
and similar considerations. By substituting prices pI and prE for pRM and
using the relationship describing the incumbents advantage qrI=(q
r
I + q
r
E) =
7
x, we can solve the demand functions of each region for arE given parameters
arI .
To determine the access price to the incumbents delivery network in
the case of work sharing we assumed a "naive" regulator that tries to set
the access price to be equal to the incumbents average costs of delivery per
unit1. Thus, the regulator divides the observed total downstream costs by
the total amount of mail delivered, and sets
 =
P
r
(crIdq
r
I) + FIdP
r
qrI
= e 0:25.
4 Results & Discussion
In this section we present the main results of the simulation. The amount
of money invested in innovation can be seen in Table 1.
Incumbent Entrant
IhIu I
h
Id I
l
Iu I
l
Id
P
IhEu I
h
Ed
P
Monopoly 42.27 42.27 4.69 4.69 93.92
End-to-end 25.39 25.39 4.69 4.69 60.16 3.81 3.81 7.62
WS without B 29.11 47.2 4.69 4.69 85.69 2.18 2.18
WS with B 25.39 25.39 4.69 4.69 60.16 3.81 3.81 7.62
Table 1: Investments in Innovation [in millions of Euro]
On the left are the incumbents investments into the urban and rural
region, followed by the entrants investments into up- and downstream ac-
tivities in the urban area. The entrant has no incentives to innovate in the
rural region because he does not enter this market. The underlying reason
is that the incumbents uniform price lies below the marginal costs in the
rural market. Therefore, the entrant is not able to set a competitive price
above marginal costs in the rural market. According to our results, the case
of work sharing with bypass equals the scenario of end-to-end competition.
This happens because the access price is higher than the entrants marginal
downstream costs, and therefore the entrant does not ask for access to the
incumbents network.
The biggest incentives to innovate can be observed in the case of a reg-
ulated monopoly. The intuition is tied to economics of scale - the total
1The determination of the access price is in itself a major subject of research. De
Donder 2004 is a recent work that explores the question of socially optimal access prices.
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savings resulting from optimized processes due to innovation are higher in
the case of only one service provider, since investment in innovation reduces
costs of each letter sent in the economy. Comparing the cases with multiple
service providers, we can see that the incumbents incentives to innovate are
greater in the case of work sharing without bypass than under end-to-end
competition or work sharing with bypass. This happens because the access
price is higher than the entrants marginal costs for delivery and therefore
the entrant is forced to raise his price(s) in the work sharing scenario. Since
the incumbents demand is positively related to the entrants price, the in-
cumbents incentives to innovate increase in the case of work sharing. For
the entrant, the opposite holds true. The entrants incentives to innovate
are greater under end-to-end competition or work sharing with bypass than
under work sharing without bypass. As already mentioned, the reason is
that the entrant has a smaller demand in the end-to-end competition sce-
nario due to the higher price the entrant has to practice. Additionally, the
entrant only has incentives to invest into optimized delivery processes if
operating in the downstream segment.
Table 2 shows the e¤ects of the observed levels of investment in in-
novation on prots. Delta refers to the added prots resulting from the
Incumbent Entrant
Investment Prot Investment Prot
Monopoly 93.92  = 93:92
(94.41)
End-to-end 60.16  = 50:59 7.62  = 6:96
competition (-50.86) (81.09)
Work sharing 85.69  = 85:8 2.18  = 2:08
without bypass (88.73) (48.54)
Work sharing 60.16  = 50:59 7.62  = 6:96
with bypass (-50.86) (81.09)
Table 2: E¤ects on Prots [in millions of Euro]
possibility of innovation. The respective service providerstotal prots are
listed in parentheses. The biggest di¤erence in prots is observed in the
case of a regulated monopoly. One reason is that as shown above, the in-
cumbents incentives to innovate are highest in the monopolistic scenario,
resulting in the biggest total gains from innovation. The other reason is that
the monopolists investments into process innovation are fully added to the
monopolists own prots, that is, neither competitors nor consumers benet
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from the monopolists innovation activity.
Comparing only the scenarios with multiple service providers, we can
see that the incumbents added prots due to innovation are much larger
under work sharing without bypass than under end-to-end competition or
work sharing with bypass. There are two reasons for this. One is that the
incumbent invests more in the work sharing without bypass scenario than
under end-to-end competition or work sharing with bypass, thus reaching a
higher level of innovation and larger cost savings. The other reason is that
the incumbent benets from the entrants innovation activity in the work
sharing without bypass scenario, but not under end-to-end competition or
work sharing with bypass. A reduction in the entrants costs and price(s)
due to innovation is translated into a higher demand for the entrants good.
Since in the work sharing without bypass the entrant uses the incumbents
delivery network, the entrant must pay a greater total access fee to the
incumbent.
Table 3 presents the e¤ects of innovation on welfare. The highest in-
Total Producer Consumer Social
Investment Surplus Surplus Surplus
Monopoly 93.92  = 93:92  = 0  = 93:92
(94.41) (1501.22) (1595.63)
End-to-end 67.77  = 57:54  = 7:28  = 64:83
competition (30.23) (1545.56) (1575.8)
Work sharing 87.87  = 87:88  = 2:13  = 90:01
without bypass (137.28) (1526.58) (1663.85)
Work sharing 67.77  = 57:54  = 7:28  = 64:83
with bypass (30.23) (1545.56) (1575.8)
Table 3: E¤ects on Welfare [in millions of Euro]
crease in social surplus is observed in the case of a regulated monopoly. The
intuition is that the monopolist is able to make the best use of more e¢ cient
processes, since he covers the entire market. It should be noted however that
the total welfare gains go to the monopolist, i.e. consumers do not get any
benet from innovation in the case of the regulated monopoly. In contrast
to this, consumers do benet from innovation whenever there are multiple
service providers, though the service providers get the lions share in all
cases. By comparing only the scenarios with multiple service providers, we
notice that the total gain in welfare in the case of work sharing without
bypass exceeds the gain in welfare under end-to-end competition and work
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sharing with bypass.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
As already mentioned before we calibrated our model using data from the
Swiss letter market. In order to evaluate the impact of a change in the para-
meters on our results we performed some sensitivity analysis. In particular,
the access price and the incumbents uniform price are important parame-
ters that we assumed were set by the regulatory authority. Thus, we present
the variations in consumers surplus and total surplus due to innovation for
di¤erent values of  and pI in the analysis that follows.
For the uniform price of the incumbent we have chosen values between
e 0:45 and e 0:6. For the access price we did the simulation for values
between e 0:175 and e 0:325. The variation in consumer surplus due to
innovation for the di¤erent uniform prices pI is shown in Figure 1.
0
7000000
14000000
0.45 0.475 0.5 0.525 0.55 0.575 0.6
monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B.
Figure 1: CS for di¤erent pI
We observe that the consumers never benet from innovation in the
case of the regulated monopoly. In contrast, we observe that the gain in
consumer surplus as a result of innovation increases with a higher uniform
price whenever there are multiple service providers. However, the total level
of consumer surplus decreases with a higher uniform price. It is important
to note that the qualitative results obtained with the initial value of the
incumbents price hold for variations of this parameter. The same happens
with the total surplus (Figure 2). As we can observe the total surplus
accruing from innovation decreases as the price of the incumbent increases.
But again, there are no changes in the relative position of the di¤erent
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monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B:
Figure 2: TS for di¤erent pI
scenarios in what concerns variations of the total surplus.
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monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B.
Figure 3: Total investment in innovation for di¤erent pI
If we look at the total investment in innovation, we can see that it
decreases as the incumbents price increases (Figure 3). The highest level of
investment is observed in the monopoly case independently of pI . However,
for higher prices the decrease in investment in innovation is higher in the
monopoly case than under end-to-end competition or work sharing with
bypass.
We now consider how the results change with di¤erent access prices.
Figure 4 shows how consumer surplus is a¤ected by a change in access price.
While the results of the monopoly, end-to-end competition and work sharing
with bypass cases are una¤ected, the results in the work sharing without
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bypass case are very sensible to variations in . In fact, in this last scenario
the gains from innovation in consumer surplus decrease with higher access
prices.
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monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B.
Figure 4: CS for di¤erent 
Still, we observe that the lines do not cross for reasonable variations of
the access price. As can be seen in Figure 5, the rung order regarding total
surplus added by the possibility of innovation is robust for variations of the
access price, though the gap between the case of work sharing without bypass
and the monopoly case decreases with an increase in access price. Total
0
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monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B.
Figure 5: TS for di¤erent 
investment, shown in Figure 6, is a¤ected in a similar way by a change in
access price. Whereas total investment in the work sharing without bypass
case converts to the investment in the monopoly case, investment for end-
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to-end competition remains constant.
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monopoly end to end WS without B. WS with B.
Figure 6: Total investment in Innovation for di¤erent 
In summary, we observe that if we consider the e¤ects of di¤erent access
prices, we can see that the work sharing without bypass case converts to the
monopoly case for higher access prices. The reason is that the high access
price prevents potential competitors from entry.
6 Spillover E¤ects
Depending on the characteristics of an innovation, it is realistic to assume
that an innovation of one service provider has positive external e¤ects on
competitors. These spillover e¤ects result from the possibility of rms to
imitate a competitors innovation. In general, the e¤ects of spillovers on
innovation incentives are negative. However, as we shall see, this is not
necessarily true under the existence of a universal service obligation. We
introduce spillover e¤ects into our model by making the following assump-
tion. Besides reducing a service providers own costs, the investments in
innovation by one service provider also reduce the competitors costs of the
same processes by an amount equal to d  krjs, where 0 > d > 1. The extent
of these e¤ects depends largely on whether innovation is tangible or not,
and whether or not it can be protected by technical or legal means. Thus,
we did not decide on any particular value for the parameter d. Instead, we
apply multiple values for d ranging from 0 to 0:9, and observe the e¤ect
of spillovers on innovation incentives and welfare. Figure 7 shows the total
investments of each service provider for increasingly strong spillover e¤ects.
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monopoly Inc. end to end Inc. WS without B. Inc. WS with B.Inc.
end to end Ent. WS without B. Ent. WS with B. Ent.
Figure 7: Total investment in innovation for di¤erent d
From the incumbents perspective, the e¤ect of spillovers on innovation
incentives is purely negative. This is because spillovers reduce the competi-
tors costs, enabling the entrant to reduce prices. Lower prices result in
lower demand for the incumbent, lowering innovation incentives. However,
from the entrants perspective, there are no negative e¤ects from spillovers.
This quite remarkable fact is a result of the assumption that the incumbents
uniform price is exogenously given. Thus, the entrant does not mind that
the incumbent is able to make use of the entrants innovations, since the
incumbent cannot lower prices and take away additional market share even
if costs are lower and prots increase.
In fact, the introduction of spillovers has a positive e¤ect on the entrants
innovation incentives. This e¤ect follows from the incumbents innovation,
which also lower the entrants marginal costs. Because of reduced marginal
costs, the entrant is able to lower prices, thus increasing demand. Therefore,
the entrants innovation incentives increase.
We summarize by saying that under the existence of a USO, spillover
e¤ects decrease the incumbents innovation incentives, but increase the en-
trants incentives. It should be noted that this is only true for process
innovations, since with regards to product innovation, imitation of the en-
trants product can increase the incumbents market share even if prices
remain unchanged.
In Figure 8, we can see the e¤ect of increasingly strong spillover e¤ects
on the welfare e¤ects of innovation. Both the di¤erence in consumer sur-
plus resulting from innovation as well as the added total surplus from the
possibility of innovation increase with stronger spillovers. Subtracting the
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Figure 8: CS and TS for di¤erent 
added consumer surplus from the added total surplus shows that the result-
ing added industry prots also increase. This result is intuitive. Decreasing
investments of the incumbent are largely compensated by increasing invest-
ments of the entrant, thus leading to only a slight change in total investment.
However, total surplus added by innovation increases since similar expenses
for innovation are used in a more e¢ cient way.
The e¤ect of spillovers on welfare is stronger under end-to-end competi-
tion and work sharing with bypass than under work sharing without bypass.
The reason is that under work sharing without bypass, there are no down-
stream e¤ects from spillovers. However, in order for end-to-end competition
and work sharing with bypass to surpass work sharing without bypass in
terms of the e¤ect of innovation on total surplus, very strong spillover ef-
fects with d > 0:75 are required.
7 Conclusion
In the postal sector, products are quite well-dened. Therefore, we con-
centrated on process innovations rather than product innovations. We as-
sumed that process innovations lower the service providers marginal costs.
Furthermore, we assumed that the levels of investment and innovation are
positively correlated. Taking into account the special characteristics of the
postal sector, we applied this structure to the regulatory scenarios currently
under discussion.
The calibration of our model allows us to conclude that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, a prot-maximizing monopolist has very high innova-
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tion incentives. However, the monopolists behavior does not translate into
added benets for the consumers.
Liberalization does not lead to higher innovation incentives. Instead, di-
viding demand between two or more service providers decreases the economies
of scale related to investment and, consequently, decreases total innovation
incentives.
For a su¢ ciently high access price, the incumbents incentives to inno-
vate in the work sharing without bypass scenario exceed the incumbents
incentives in the scenarios of end-to-end competition and work sharing with
bypass. In contrast, the entrants incentives to innovate increase with full
liberalization of the value chain compared to partial liberalization as done
under work sharing.
An interesting result is that innovation is used in a more e¢ cient way
under work sharing without bypass than under end-to-end competition or
work sharing with bypass. That is, similar levels of investment result in a
bigger gain in social surplus under work sharing without bypass than under
end-to-end competition or work sharing with bypass.
By examining spillover e¤ects, we observed that although the incum-
bents innovation incentives decrease, the entrants incentives increase. These
increasing incentives of the entrant largely compensate for the incumbents
declining incentives.
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